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COMMENT
CORROSION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN
NORTH CAROLINA: A COMPARISON OF STATE V.
BREWINGTON AND STATE V. ORTIZ-ZAPE
WITH STATE V. CRAVEN
MICHELLE M. WEINER*
PART 1: INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses
against him."' The device for confrontation is cross-examination,
which has been described as "the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth."2 "The Confrontation Clause protects us
all by mandating that testimony against the accused is subject to 'the
crucible of cross-examination.' "3
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation has been hailed as
"part of the bedrock of American freedom since the beginning of the
Republic."' However, the application of this guarantee is sometimes
at odds with established exceptions to the hearsay rule, which allow
out-of-court statements to be admitted for the truth of the matter as-
serted, even when the declarant is not present at trial and not subject
to confrontation by the defendant.' "Current Confrontation Clause
* B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Art History, 2009; Juris Doctor can-
didate, North Carolina Central University School of Law, 2015. I would like to thank my par-
ents, Madeline and Michael Weiner, for their constant support and encouragement. Thanks also
to the members of the North Carolina Central Law Review for helpful feedback and editing, and
for making the publication of this article possible.
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3. Michael A. Sabino & Anthony Michael Sabino, Article, Confronting the "Crucible of
Cross-Examination": Reconciling the Supreme Court's Recent Edicts on the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause, 65 BAYLOR L. Riv. 255, 257 (2013).
4. Id. at 256; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (describing the Sixth
Amendment as a "bedrock procedural guarantee [that] applies to both federal and state
prosecutions.").
5. John R. Grimm, Note, A Wavering Bright Line: How Crawford v. Washington Denies
Defendants a Consistent Confrontation Right, 40 AM. CRIM. L. Ruv. 185, 185 (2011).
295
1
Weiner: Corrosion of the Confrontation Clause in North Carolina: A Compar
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2014
296 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:295
jurisprudence has been defined by the struggle to reconcile these con-
flicting principles." 6
The protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment are separate
and above the evidentiary rules that govern the admissibility of evi-
dence. Although "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are
generally designed to protect similar values," the Confrontation
Clause is not to be understood as "nothing more or less than a codifi-
cation of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions."' Pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause, the rules of evidence are without effect when they
contradict provisions of the United States Constitution; the protec-
tions guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment cannot be circumvented by reliance on the rules of evidence.'
The United States Supreme Court explained that "[1]eaving the regu-
lation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render
the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant
inquisitorial practices."' When faced with testimonial statements, the
Framers intended that the criminal defendant be guaranteed the pro-
tections of the Sixth Amendment."o
The question of whether an expert witness can present an expert
opinion based on statements and analyses prepared out of court has
created a division among lower courts around the country." On June
27, 2013, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided five cases re-
garding the Confrontation Clause that sought to resolve this tenuous
struggle between constitutional and evidentiary concerns. 12  The
Court addressed the basic issue of "whether an expert who bases an
opinion on otherwise inadmissible facts and data may, consistent with
the Confrontation Clause, disclose those facts and data to the
factfinder."' 3 In each case, an expert witness in the area of forensic
science testified to the identity of a controlled substance that was al-
6. Id.
7. Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56.
8. See State v. Brewington, - N.C. , , 743 S.E.2d 626, 632 (2013) (Beasley, J.,
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No.
13-504) (explaining that the "rules of evidence cannot be used to escape the Confrontation
Clause,"); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
9. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
10. Id. at 61 ("Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence.").
11. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739, at *10 (Nov. 21, 2013) (citing Nardi v. Pepe, 662 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.
2011); United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2009)).
12. The five cases are: State v. Ortiz-Zape, N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 156 (2013), petition for
cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No. 13-633); Brewington,
N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 626; State v. Craven, - N.C. -, 744 S.E.2d 458 (2013); State v. Williams,
N.C. -, 744 S.E.2d 125 (2013); and State v. Brent, - N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 152 (2013). See
also http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/ (follow N.C. Supreme Court Opinions 2013).
13. Ortiz-Zape, N.C. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 162.
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legedly confiscated from the defendant, but the witness had no per-
sonal knowledge of the testing that was actually performed on the
substance.14 This issue could have been easily resolved with a proper
reading of the relevant constitutional provision and the binding prece-
dent." However, based on its misinterpretation of the Constitution
and existing United States Supreme Court precedent, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court has over-complicated an already unclear area of
law, and has failed to meet its "charge as a Court .. . to provide gui-
dance to lower courts."' 6
This Comment will criticize the recent rule announced by the North
Carolina Supreme Court; it will suggest to State of North Carolina a
simple solution that will allow it to protect the rights of criminal de-
fendants, while ensuring that convictions are not vacated or over-
turned because of an avoidable technicality. Part II of this Comment
will discuss the evolution of the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence as it relates to forensic science. Part III will discuss the
factual background and procedural history of the series of North Car-
olina Supreme Court opinions filed on June 27, 2013. Part IV will
provide an analysis of the Court's rule, and discuss two central flaws in
the majority's reasoning. Finally, Part V will advocate to the State of
North Carolina a simple solution to this over-complicated and analyti-
cally challenging legal issue.
PART 11
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment demands that
when the State presents the results of forensic testing as the substan-
tive evidence against a criminal defendant, that defendant has the
right to cross-examine the analyst who actually performed the test-
ing." The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the
14. Id. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 158-59; Brewington, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 626-27;
Craven, - N.C. at , 744 S.E.2d at 460-62; Williams, N.C. at , 744 S.E.2d at 126-27;
Brent, - N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 153-54.
15. See Craven, - N.C. at -, 744 S.E.2d at 462 (Hudson, J., concurring) (concluding that
"in this slice of cases-in which certified lab reports prepared for this prosecution are entered
into evidence through a surrogate witness who was not involved in the testing-the approach can
be quite simple.").
16. See Ortiz-Zape, N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 171 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (explaining
that "[p]art of our charge as a Court is to provide guidance to lower courts."); see also Brew-
ington, - N.C. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 638 (Beasley, J., dissenting) ("I fear our lower courts will
be left with no guidance on what constitutes an 'independent opinion' when data are 'truly ma-
chine-generated,' and when a violation of the Confrontation Clause has occurred.").
17. See, e.g., Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (holding that "[t]he accused's
right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst is un-
available at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular
scientist."). But cf Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 277 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (allowing
testimony that was clearly prohibited by the Confrontation Clause, the Court's fractured deci-
sion "left significant confusion in their wake.").
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right to confront witnesses, or "those who 'bear testimony,"' against
him.' 8 The analysis of the Confrontation Clause has evolved dramati-
cally in the decade since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Crawford v. Washington.' Before Crawford, the prosecution could
introduce hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant, as long as
the statement fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, or the
court otherwise determined that the statement possessed "adequate
'indicia of reliability.' "20 Under Crawford, testimonial statements of a
witness who is absent from trial may be admitted only if: (1) the de-
clarant is unavailable, and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.21 The Court in Crawford declined to
set forth a comprehensive definition of "testimonial statements,"2 2 but
did explain that "testimony . . . is typically 'a solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact."' 23 Writing for a unified Court, Justice Scalia described various
formulations of "testimonial statements," including "statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective wit-
ness to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial."2 4 The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford set forth a radical
new precedent, and initiated a series of cases in which the Court at-
tempted to define the parameters of this new rule.
The rule established in Crawford has been difficult for courts to
consistently apply, especially in the area of expert testimony.2 5 The
application of the Crawford rule to forensic laboratory reports has
been a controversial area of jurisprudence, particularly since forensic
science has "become such an important and routinized aspect of our
criminal justice system."2 6 From the outset, North Carolina courts
have been reluctant to apply Crawford and its progeny in a forthright
manner.2 7 Before Crawford, "many jurisdictions found it irresistibly
tempting to allow prosecutors to present the results of forensic lab
18. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
19. See, e.g., Libby Greismann, Williams v. Illinois: Another Look at Expert Testimony and
the Confrontation Clause, 7 DUKE J. CONsr. LAw & PP SIDEBAR 133, 133 (2012).
20. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see also Richard D. Friedman, Sixth Annual
Criminal Law Symposium: The Sixth Amendment: Panel One: Confrontation: Confrontation and
Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45 TEx. TEcii. L. Rev. 51, 51 (2012).
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
22. Id. at 61.
23. Id. at 51.
24. Id.
25. See Brief for North Carolina Advocates for Justice as Aimici Curae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 WL 6858555, at *8-9 (Dec. 26, 2013)
("Crawford has proved complicated to apply, particularly in the area of expert testimony.").
26. See Friedman, supra note 20, at 53.
27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739, at *5-8 (Nov. 21, 2013).
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tests by presenting reports from the lab without the need for a live
witness." 28 In fact, the North Carolina General Assembly passed a
statute effective December 1, 2004 (after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Crawford) that allows "the results of [a laboratory report of a
written forensic analysis] that is signed and sworn to by the person
performing the analysis [to] be admissible in evidence without the tes-
timony of the analyst who prepared the report."29 However, under
Crawford, it should be clear that when a forensic laboratory report is
created with the understanding that it will be used as evidence against
a criminal defendant, that report is testimonial and thus subject to the
Confrontation Clause.30
In 2009, the United States Supreme Court addressed the meaning of
"testimonial" as it relates to certified lab reports.3" In Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, the Court explained that affidavits prepared by labo-
ratory analysts are "testimonial statements, and the analysts were 'wit-
nesses' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment."3 2 The defendant is
entitled to be confronted with the testing analyst at trial, unless the
State shows that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and
that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that ana-
lyst.3 3 Justice Scalia, again writing for the Court, explained that scien-
tific reports are not immune from confrontation based on the
reliability of the science that is used because, "[1]ike the eyewitness
who fabricated his account to the police, the analyst who provides
false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false testi-
mony."34 As with any expert witness, cross-examination allows the
defendant to expose an analyst's deficiency in judgment, lack of train-
ing, or failure to follow protocol.3 5 Melendez-Diaz thus establishes
that this type of laboratory report may not be admitted against a crim-
inal defendant without the testimony of a witness who has personal
knowledge of, and is competent to testify to, the truth of the state-
ments set forth in the report.36
In the 2011 case of Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the application of the Confrontation Clause
28. Id.
29. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-58.20 (2011).
30. Friedman, supra note 20, at 53.
31. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 307 (2009); see also State v. Ortiz-Zape,
N.C. , -, 743 S.E.2d 156, 166 (2013) (Hudson, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 2013
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No. 13-633).
32. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 319.
35. Id. at 320.
36. See id; see also Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 166 (Hudson, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bulicoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709 (2011)).
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to forensic laboratory reports. The specific issue before the Court
was whether, under the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution was al-
lowed to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimo-
nial certification through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did
not perform or observe the reported test.38 The testing analyst's affi-
davit certified facts other than machine-generated data, such as an un-
broken chain of custody, the particular test performed, and the
analyst's adherence to protocol in performing that test.39 Writing for
the Court, Justice Ginsburg explained that it is "[t]hese representa-
tions, relating to past events and human actions not revealed in raw,
machine-produced data, [that] are meet for cross-examination." 4 0
Further, this type of "surrogate testimony" can neither "expose any
lapses or lies" of the testing analyst, nor convey what the testing ana-
lyst knew or observed about the particular test and testing process.4'
The Court held that, although the proffered expert in Bullcoming was
competent to testify regarding the general lab procedures, this type of
"surrogate testimony" did not satisfy the constitutional demands pre-
scribed by the Sixth Amendment.42 Justice Ginsburg's decision in
Bullcoming established a clear rule for lower courts to follow: the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right confront the
testing analyst, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the ac-
cused had an opportunity before trial to cross-examine that particular
scientist.43 The Bullcoming rule thus protects the Sixth Amendment
rights of criminal defendants, while providing a straightforward stan-
dard for lower courts to follow.
However, just one year after Bullcoming, the Supreme Court cre-
ated widespread confusion with its "fractured" four-one-four plurality
in Williams v. Illinois.4 4 The Court in Williams considered whether
Crawford prevents an expert witness from expressing an opinion that
is based on facts about which the expert is not competent to testify.4 5
37. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2705.
38. Id. at 2710.
39. Id. at 2714.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2715.
42. Id. at 2710; see also State v. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. , 743 S.E.2d 156, 166 (2013)
(Hudson, J., dissenting), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21,
2013) (No. 13-633).
43. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
44. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2265 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also
DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEw WIGMORE: A
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.12.11 (Aspen Publishers, 2014) ("The Williams
decision-and indeed the unruly array of opinions across many jurisdictions applying the Con-
frontation Clause to forensic-science evidence-has perplexed lower courts seeking coherence,
or at least clarity.").
45. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
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Five Justices (the four Justice plurality and Justice Thomas) found that
the underlying report was not testimonial, and therefore not a Con-
frontation Clause violation.46 However, Justice Thomas based his
conclusion on a different analysis than the plurality, and in fact ex-
pressly rejected the plurality's reasoning.4 7 To confound matters even
further, five Justices (Justice Thomas and the four Justice dissent)
found that the report was offered for the truth of the matter asserted
therein.4 8 "This disagreement among the members of [the Supreme
Court] as to the proper interpretation and application of the Confron-
tation Clause has left the lower courts in disarray."4 9 Specifically, af-
ter Williams, it is still unclear what is considered "testimonial" when
an expert opinion is based in whole or in substantial part on the analy-
sis and opinions of an out-of-court expert.s0
The Williams decision must be read on extremely narrow grounds,
and it does not apply to any of the cases decided by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court on June 27, 2013. "When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds."" Justice Beasley correctly explained that
"the only common, and thereby narrowest, ground between Justice
Thomas's concurrence and the plurality opinion is that there is no
Confrontation Clause violation in a case having the exact fact pattern
of Williams."5 2 Part of the North Carolina Supreme Court's confusion
in these cases appears to stem from its misinterpretation of the Wil-
liams decision.5 1 Justice Kagan forecasted the potential turbulence
46. Id.; see also Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 167 n. 6 (Hudson, J., dissenting)
("I believe the only firm conclusions we can draw from Williams are that the lab report there was
not testimonial and that five justices agreed it was offered for its truth. These conclusions appear
to apply only to the precise facts in Williams. Because it is clear that the lab report here was
testimonial, as well as offered for its truth, Williams gives us little additional guidance."); and
State v. Brewington, _ N.C. -, -, 743 S.E.2d 626, 636 n.2 (2013) (Beasley, J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504)
("Here ... [t]here is no question that [the report] is testimonial in nature, even under Justice
Thomas's standards.").
47. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2253 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Brew-
ington, _ N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 636 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
49. Brief for North Carolina Advocates for Justice as Aimici Curae Supporting Petitioner,
Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 WL 6858555, at *2 (Dec. 26, 2013).
50. Id. at *4.
51. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n. 15 (1976)).
52. State v. Brewington, N.C.__ 743 S.E.2d 626, 636 (2013) (Beasley, J., dissent-
ing), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
53. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739, at *27-28 (Nov. 21, 2013). ("The North Carolina Supreme Court failed
to recognize the key distinctions between Williams v. Illinois and the present appeal. Addition-
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that Williams would create when she lamented in her dissent that the
plurality "'left significant confusion in [its] wake' because of an appar-
ent desire to retreat from the Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcom-
ing trilogy, resulting in a view of 'who knows what' because 'no
proposed limitation commands the support of a majority."' 54 Refer-
encing Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, Justice Kagan explained that
prior to Williams, if the State wished to admit the results of forensic
testing, it was required to produce the testing analyst, and that "until a
majority of this Court reverses or confines those decisions, I would
understand them as continuing to govern, in every particular, the ad-
mission of forensic evidence." 5 Williams should be completely disre-
garded except in cases that present the exact facts of that case. As
none of the five cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court
on June 27, 2013 involve the same facts as were present in Williams,
the Williams opinion is not relevant to this analysis.5 6
PART III
On June 27, 2013, the North Carolina Supreme Court issued five
opinions regarding the application of the Confrontation Clause as it
relates to the admissibility of forensic evidence. These cases reveal
three discrete perspectives within the North Carolina Supreme Court:
the four-Justice majority consisting of Justices Newby, Jackson, Ed-
munds, and Martin; the two-Justice dissent of Justice Hudson and
Chief Justice Parker; and Justice Beasley who dissented alone. 8 This
Comment will focus on the three most substantive in this series of
decisions: State v. Ortiz-Zape, State v. Brewington, and State v. Cra-
ven. The issue that the Court addressed in each case is "whether an
expert who bases an opinion on otherwise inadmissible facts and data
may, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, disclose those facts
and data to the factfinder." 9 The majority emphasized that the an-
swer to this question turns on a determination of whether the expert's
testimony is an "independent opinion" or "surrogate testimony"; how-
ally, the North Carolina Supreme Court placed undue reliance on the precedential value of Wil-
liams v. Illinois.").
54. Brief for North Carolina Advocates for Justice as Aimici Curae Supporting Petitioner,
Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 WL 6858555, at *6 (Dec. 26, 2013) (quoting
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2277) (Kagan, J., dissenting)).
55. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2277 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
56. See Brewington, - N.C. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 636 (Beasley, J., dissenting) (explaining
that "Williams ... is simply not binding upon this case.").
57. See supra note 12.
58. Justice Beasley only participated in three of the seven decisions: State v. Brewington,
State v. Williams, and State v. Hough.
59. State v. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. _,, 743 S.E.2d 156, 162 (2013), petition for cert. filed,
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No. 13-633).
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2014], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol36/iss2/5
2014] CORROSION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
ever, the North Carolina Supreme Court failed to set forth a clear
definition of either term. 6 0 Further, the rules announced in each indi-
vidual opinion take on a new meaning when the cases are read as a
whole. Together, these three cases set forth a contradictory rule that
essentially road-maps an end-run around Crawford the Confrontation
Clause.61
A comparison of Ortiz-Zape and Brewington with Craven will illus-
trate the arbitrary and troublesome nature of the rule crafted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. In both Ortiz-Zape and Brewington,
the majority held that the challenged testimony was an "independent
opinion" based on the expert's own scientific analysis, and therefore
not subject to the protections of the Sixth Amendment. 62 However, in
Craven, the Court came to the opposite conclusion with nearly identi-
cal facts. 63 These three cases reveal two central flaws in the majority's
reasoning: first, the majority's confusion between the evidentiary and
constitutional issues presented by these cases; and second, the Court's
arbitrary and unfounded reliance on the classification of evidence as
an independent opinion or surrogate testimony.
A. Holding the Challenged Testimony Was Not a Violation of the
Confrontation Clause
1. State v. Ortiz-Zape
State v. Ortiz-Zape involves the arrest of the defendant, Mario
Eduardo Ortiz-Zape, for possession with intent to sell or deliver co-
caine.6 4 The substance allegedly confiscated from the defendant (Item
Number 9) was sent to the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department
(CMPD) crime lab for analysis, where it was tested by a chemist
named Jennifer Mills.6 5 At trial, the State sought to introduce the re-
sults of the analysis through the testimony of Agent Tracey Ray of the
CMPD crime lab as an expert in forensic chemistry.6 6 Agent Ray did
not personally perform and was not present during the tests per-
formed on Item Number 9.67 At trial, the defendant challenged ad-
mission of this evidence based on Sixth Amendment grounds, and
60. See id. ("We emphasize that the expert must present an independent opinion obtained
through his or her own analysis and not merely 'surrogate testimony,' parroting otherwise inad-
missible statements.") (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011)).
61. See Brewington, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 634 (Beasley, J., dissenting) ("We must
not create a back door to evade the Confrontation Clause by merely changing the diction from
surrogate' to 'independent opinion."').
62. Id.; Ortiz-Zape, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 165.
63. See State v. Craven, N.C. _, -, 744 S.E.2d 458, 462 (2013).
64. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 157-58.
65. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 158.
66. Id.
67. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 163.
303
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"sought to exclude admission of a lab report created by a non-testify-
ing analyst and any testimony by any lab analyst who did not perform
the tests or write the lab report."6  The trial court ruled that Agent
Ray could testify about the practices and procedures of the CMPD
crime lab, her review of the testing of the substance, and her "inde-
pendent opinion" concerning the testing; however, the trial court ex-
cluded admission of Agent Mills' laboratory report under North
Carolina Rule of Evidence 403.69
After testifying about the standard lab procedures for receipt, stor-
age, and testing of substances, Agent Ray testified that she conducted
a "peer review" of the chemical analysis of Item Number 9.70 Agent
Ray explained that her "peer review" consisted of "review[ing] the
drug chemistry worksheet or the lab notes that the analyst wrote her
notes on and the data that came from the instrument that was in the
case file and then [she] also reviewed the data that was on the instru-
ment and made sure that was all there too."" Agent Ray described
the tests that Agent Mills performed on the substance, and when
asked to give her "independent expert opinion," Agent Ray re-
sponded, "[m]y conclusion was that the substance was cocaine."7 2 On
cross-examination, defense counsel emphasized that any opinions
Agent Ray gave regarding the identity of the substance were based
entirely on testing done by someone else, that Agent Ray was not
present when the testing was performed, and that her testimony as-
sumed that Agent Mills had followed standard lab procedures when
testing Item Number 9." The jury found the defendant guilty of pos-
session of cocaine, and the defendant appealed.74
In an unpublished opinion, a unanimous North Carolina Court of
Appeals panel reversed the decision of the trial court.75 The Court
explained that, because the State failed to prove all elements of the
charged crime, the defendant's motion to dismiss should have been
granted.7 6 "An essential element of felony possession of cocaine is
evidence that the substance . . . was actually cocaine. Cocaine can
only be identified through chemical analysis. The State did not prop-
erly present any chemical analysis which identified the white sub-
68. Id. at 743 S.E.2d at 158.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 743 S.E.2d at 168 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 159 (majority opinion).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. State v. Ortiz-Zape, 213 N.C. App. 425, 714 S.E.2d 275, 2011 WL 2848792, at *3 (2011),
rev'd, - N.C. , 743 S.E.2d 156 (June 27, 2013).
76. Id.
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stance as cocaine."" The Court therefore concluded that it was
reversible error to allow Agent Ray's testimony." The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary re-
view, and in a four-two opinion, reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that Agent Ray's testi-
mony was not surrogate testimony, but instead it was her own "inde-
pendently reasoned opinion."s0 The Court came to this conclusion by
explaining that the prosecution laid the proper foundation for Agent
Ray's testimony under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 703 by spe-
cifically asking, "are these tests standards such that other experts in
the field of forensic chemistry would rely upon them in performing
[sic] the opinion as to the identity of a chemical substance."8' Relying
on outdated precedent and the rules of evidence, the Court explained
that "when an expert gives an opinion, it is the expert opinion itself,
not its underlying factual basis, which constitutes substantive evi-
dence. Therefore, when an expert gives an opinion, the expert is the
witness whom the defendant has the right to confront."8 2 The Court
thus concluded that "[t]his expert opinion, from Ray's own analysis of
the data, constituted the substantive evidence being presented against
defendant.""
After explaining that .'representations[ ] relating to past events and
human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data' may not
be admitted through 'surrogate testimony,'"84 the majority concluded
that, "[a]ccordingly, consistent with the Confrontation Clause, if of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field, raw data
generated by a machine may be admitted for the purpose of showing
the basis of an expert's opinion."" While the Court relied heavily on
the distinction between an independent opinion and surrogate testi-
mony, it went no further to define the boundaries of these two amor-
phous concepts. 8 6
77. Id. (internal citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. Ortiz-Zape, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 165 (Justice Beasley, who was a member of
the three-judge panel at the Court of Appeals, did not participate in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case.).
80. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting Bulicoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710
(2011)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 162, 557 S.E.2d 500, 552
(2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114 (2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
83. Id. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 164. See Fair, 354 N.C. 162, 557 S.E.2d 552.
84. Ortiz-Zape, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 161 (quoting Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714).
85. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
86. Id. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 162 ("We emphasize that the expert must present an indepen-
dent opinion obtained through his or her own analysis and not merely 'surrogate testimony'
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In her dissenting opinion, Justice Hudson severely criticized the ma-
jority's misinterpretation of Supreme Court precedent, and empha-
sized that there was no indication in the record that Agent Ray
conducted an "independent analysis" of Item Number 9.18 Justice
Hudson explained that "Agent Ray did not simply evaluate raw
data-she reviewed the lab report and testified to some of its contents,
specifically which tests the nontestifying analyst conducted and the re-
sults of those tests."" Agent Ray's analysis was not "independent"
because all she did was "simply view[ ] and agree[ ] with the test re-
sults of another."" She was not present for any of the tests, and
therefore had to rely entirely on the certification by the testing analyst
that the tests were in fact performed, and were performed in compli-
ance with the standard procedure and without error.90 Under
Bullcoming, "these representations, relating to past events and human
actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meet for
cross-examination." 91
2. State v. Brewington
State v. Brewington involves the arrest of the defendant, John Ed-
ward Brewington, for possession of cocaine.92 The "rock-like sub-
stance" allegedly confiscated from the defendant was transported to
the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) laboratory
where it was analyzed by Assistant Supervisor in Charge Nancy Greg-
ory.9 3 Agent Gregory preformed the chemical analysis on the sub-
stance, and prepared a written report concluding that the substance
was "cocaine base" weighing 0.1 gram.9 4 At trial, the State did not
elicit the testimony of Agent Gregory to introduce this evidence; in-
stead, the prosecution introduced the testimony of SBI Special Agent
Kathleen Schell." Agent Schell is an employee of the SBI laboratory,
but she did not personally perform, observe, or certify any of the tests
parroting otherwise inadmissible statements."); see also DAVID H. KAYE7, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN
& JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, supra note 44 ("State v. Ortiz-Zape illustrates the extraordinarily fine
line between the use of a surrogate witness (as prohibited in Bullcoming) and the use of an
alternate witness expressing an allegedly independent opinion based on evidence that would be
testimonial if introduced for its truth (as the plurality in Williams permits).").
87. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 168 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 743 S.E.2d at 170 (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 168.
90. Id. at 743 S.E.2d at 170.
91. Id. (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714 (2011)).
92. State v. Brewington, - N.C. , , 743 S.E.2d 626, 626 (2013), petition for cert. filed,
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
93. Id. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 627.
94. Id.; see also, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brewington v. North Carolina, No. 13-504,
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258, at *5 (Oct. 17, 2013).
95. Brewington, _ N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 626.
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performed on the substance allegedly recovered from the crime
scene.96
At trial, the defendant objected and moved to exclude Agent
Schell's testimony as a violation of the Confrontation Clause." The
defendant argued that the Confrontation Clause entitled him to cross-
examine the expert who actually performed the forensic testing, and
that Agent Schell's testimony was thus inadmissible." The trial court
denied the defendant's motion." Referring to Agent Gregory's notes,
Agent Schell testified as to what tests were performed on the sub-
stance, and the results of those tests.100 When asked for her "opinion
as to the identity of the substance," Agent Schell responded that the
substance was "cocaine base [with] a weight of 0.1 gram."10 ' Further,
Agent Schell answered affirmatively when asked on cross-examina-
tion, "they sent you here to testify from that person's notes who actu-
ally did the test; is that right?" 10 2
The jury convicted the defendant of possession of cocaine, and the
defendant appealed arguing that it was error to allow Agent Schell's
testimony to identify the "rock-like" substance.o The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals agreed, explaining that "to allow a testifying
expert to reiterate the conclusions of a non-testifying expert would
eviscerate the protection of the Confrontation Clause."TO4 After re-
viewing the transcript of Special Agent Schell's testimony, the Court
stated that, "[i]t is clear from the testimony of Special Agent Schell
that she had no part in conducting any testing on the substance, nor
did she conduct any independent analysis of the substance."'os Thus,
the Court distinguished between an expert opinion based on a review
of the actual substance that was confiscated, as opposed to an alleg-
edly independent opinion of an inadmissible laboratory report pre-
pared by a non-testifying expert.'06 This distinction is crucial in
determining whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause rights have been protected. The Court concluded that, "[a]s
Special Agent Schell testified, her expert opinion could go no further
than the determination that she 'would have come to the same conclu-
sion' as the testing analyst. This . . . is not an independent expert
96. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brewington, supra note 94, at *6.
97. Brewington, 204 N.C. App. at 69-70, 693 S.E.2d at 184.
98. Id.
99. Brewington, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 627.
100. Id.
101. Brewington, 204 N.C. App. at 72, 693 S.E.2d at 185.
102. Brewington, - N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 630 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at _ , 743 S.E.2d at 627 (majority opinion).
104. Brewington, 204 N.C. App. at 78, 693 S.E.2d at 189.




Weiner: Corrosion of the Confrontation Clause in North Carolina: A Compar
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2014
308 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:295
opinion arising from the observation and analysis of raw data."10 7 Ac-
cordingly, the Court unanimously ordered that the defendant was en-
titled to a new trial. 0 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for
discretionary review, and in a four-three opinion, reversed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals. 10 9 The Court held that "Agent Schell
presented an independent opinion formed as a result of her own anal-
ysis, not mere surrogate testimony." t o Agent Schell's testimony re-
vealed that she would have come to the same conclusion that Agent
Gregory did, but only if Agent Gregory followed the correct proce-
dures, and only if she did not make any mistakes."' The majority
noted the conclusion from the Court of Appeals that "it is precisely
these' ifs' that need to be explored upon cross-examination to test the
reliability of the evidence." 1 12 Without responding to the merits of
this statement, the Court reasoned that the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights were satisfied because he "was able to conduct a vigorous
and searching cross-examination that exposed the basis of, and any
weaknesses in, Agent Schell's opinion."' 1 3
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Hudson lamented that the major-
ity in Brewington went "even farther astray than in Ortiz-Zape."114
Justice Hudson explained that in Brewington, unlike in Ortiz-Zape,
"Agent Schell was not asked and made no attempt to characterize her
testimony as an 'independent expert opinion."'"" In Ortiz-Zape,
Agent Ray avoided reference to the testing analyst's conclusions;
however, in Brewington, Agent Schell "actually introduced through
her testimony Agent Gregory's conclusion from the lab report-the
very conclusion that the trial court had explicitly ruled was inadmissi-
ble without testimony from Agent Gregory."116 By informing the jury
of the conclusion in the laboratory report, that the substance was 0.1
grams of cocaine, Agent Schell "informed the jury of the absent ana-
lyst's testimonial conclusion and thereby acted as a surrogate rather
than an independent witness." 17 This is plainly the type of "surrogate
107. Id. at 82, 693 S.E.2d at 191.
108. Id. at 83, 693 S.E.2d at 192.
109. State v. Brewington, - N.C. _,, 743 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2013), petition for cert. filed,
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
110. Id.
111. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 627 (Agent Schell testified that "[b]ased upon all the data that
[Agent Gregory] obtained from the analysis of that particular item . . . I would have come to the
same conclusion that she did." Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 630).
112. Id.
113. Id. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 628.





North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2014], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol36/iss2/5
2014] CORROSION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
testimony" prohibited by Bullcoming,"8 and admissibility of this con-
stitutionally prohibited evidence cannot be saved by framing the testi-
mony as an "independent expert opinion" when it is clear that the
"opinion was entirely based on another's work and notes, and in-
volved no independent analysis whatsoever.""1 9
Justice Beasley wrote a separate dissent in Brewington, and focused
her analysis on the role that the challenged evidence played in the
defendant's conviction.1 2 0 Justice Beasley rejected the majority's rea-
soning, and explained that she would instead examine the "true and
actual purpose" of the evidence, and the centrality of the evidence to
the State's case, in considering whether there was a violation of the
Confrontation Clause.12 1 Justice Beasley stated that "[i]n this case,
the majority determines that the expert opinion was independent and
that the underlying information relied upon was not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted. This holding contradicts the United
States Constitution, United States Supreme Court precedent, and this
Court's precedent." 2 2 Allowing the defendant to cross-examine the
testifying expert is not sufficient because it "fails to address concerns
regarding the critical evidence itself."' 2 3 Thus, Justice Beasley focused
her analysis of the Confrontation Clause on the centrality and purpose
of the evidence in the proceeding.'2 4
In both Ortiz-Zape and Brewington, the majority of the North Car-
olina Supreme Court held that the challenged testimony was an "inde-
pendent opinion" based on the expert's own scientific analysis, and
thus not subject to the Sixth Amendment.12 5 The Court used faulty
logic when it explained that "when an expert gives an opinion, it is the
expert opinion itself, not its underlying factual basis, that constitutes
substantive evidence. Therefore, when an expert gives an opinion, the
expert is the witness whom the defendant has the right to confront." 1 2 6
However, in State v. Craven, the Court faced a similar factual situation
as in Brewington and Ortiz-Zape, but held that admitting the expert
testimony would deprive the defendant of any meaningful cross-exam-
ination, as is his right under the Sixth Amendment.12 7 Therefore, a
118. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 628-29.
119. Id. at , 743 S.E.2d at 628.
120. Id. at 743 S.E.2d at 629.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 743 S.E.2d at 632 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
123. Id at , 743 S.E.2d at 631.
124. See id.
125. See id at -, 743 S.E.2d at 628 (Hudson, J., dissenting); State v. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C.
, , 743 S.E.2d 156, 165 (2013), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739
(U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No. 13-633).
126. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 621.
127. See State v. Craven, - N.C. , , 744 S.E.2d 458, 465 (2013).
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comparison of these three cases highlights the arbitrary and illogical
rule established by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
B. Holding the Challenged Testimony Was a Violation of the
Confrontation Clause
In State v. Craven, the defendant, Marcus Arnell Craven, was
charged with possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, and
with sale and delivery of cocaine.128 The charges arose out of three
separate "controlled buy" operations conducted by the Chatham
County Sheriff's Department on March 3, 2008, March 6, 2008, and
March 21, 2008.129 The three samples of crack cocaine recovered from
the three separate controlled buy operations were sent to the North
Carolina SBI laboratory for analysis. 13 0
Three different agents tested the samples from the three controlled
buy operations.' Agents Tom Shoopman and Irvin Allcox per-
formed the testing on the samples from March 3, 2008 and March 6,
2008, respectively.'3 2 Agent Kathleen Schell personally tested the
sample from March 21, 2008.133 At trial, the State called Agent Schell
to testify about the identity, composition, and weight of the three sub-
stances recovered on each of the three controlled buy dates.134 The
court admitted all three laboratory reports into evidence.3 s With re-
gard to the substances that Agent Schell did not personally test, the
prosecutor asked Agent Schell what conclusion the testing analyst
reached, and Agent Schell read into the record the results listed on
the reports.13 6 The defendant objected to this testimony on Sixth
Amendment grounds, claiming that Agent Schell's testimony and the
admission of the laboratory reports violated his right to confront wit-
nesses against him."' The trial court overruled the defendant's objec-
tion, and he was convicted of the charged offenses.13 8
The defendant appealed his conviction to the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. 139 A unanimous Court of Appeals panel vacated the con-
victions for the charges arising out of the March 3, 2008 and March 6,
128. Id.
129. Id. at , 744 S.E.2d 459.





135. Id. at , 744 S.E.2d at 461.
136. Id.
137. Id. at , 744 S.E.2d at 460.
138. Id.
139. State v. Craven, 205 N.C. App. 393, 394, 696 S.E.2d 750, 751 (2010).
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2008 transactions.140 However, the Court found no error in the con-
victions based on the March 21, 2008 events.141 Upon petition by the
State for discretionary review, the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed this decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to the rem-
edy, and ordered a new trial on the March 6, 2008 sale or delivery
conviction.142 The Court left undisturbed the decision of the Court of
Appeals regarding the two remaining convictions.143
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that Agent Schell's testi-
mony regarding the two samples that she did not personally test was a
violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
rights.144 The Court stated that "Agent Schell did not offer-or even
purport to offer-her own independent analysis or opinion on the 3
March and 6 March 2008 samples. Instead, Agent Schell merely par-
roted [the testing analysts'] conclusions from their lab reports."l 45
Citing to Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz, the Court explained that
Agent Schell's statements amounted to testimonial hearsay, and
therefore triggered the protections of the Confrontation Clause. 46
Accordingly, the Court held that allowing this "surrogate testimony"
constituted a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation because "the State did not show that [the testing ana-
lysts] were unavailable, and that defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine them."14 7
Justice Hudson concurred with the majority's judgment, but contin-
ued her firm opposition to the rule announced by the majority in Or-
tiz-Zape.1 48 Justice Hudson explained that "[b]ecause both reports
were offered and received into evidence through Agent Schell's testi-
mony without any limitation on purpose, over defendant's objection
based on the Confrontation Clause, their admission into evidence
without testimony from the testing analysts was a clear violation of the
Confrontation Clause under Bullcoming. "14 Further, Justice Hudson
emphasized that this Confrontation Clause error allowed the admis-
sion of the crucial evidence of a central element of the charged of-
fense.15 0 A witness's status as an expert witness does not eliminate
140. Id. at 405, 696 S.E.2d at 756.
141. Id.
142. Craven, _ N.C. at -, 744 S.E.2d at 462.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at , 744 S.E.2d at 461.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at , 744 S.E.2d at 462 (Hudson, J., concurring in the result).
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the protections of the Confrontation Clause.'' Justice Hudson as-
serted that, "there is nothing independent about agreeing with a con-
clusion in an inadmissible report. This testimony is functionally
indistinguishable from the testimony prohibited in Bullcoming, in that
it deprives defendant of any meaningful cross-examination regarding
either agent's testing procedures."1 52
PART IV
The rule that the North Carolina Supreme Court announced
through this series of opinions confuses the evidentiary and constitu-
tional issues, and places undue reliance on the arbitrary classification
of evidence as an independent opinion as opposed to surrogate testi-
mony. The rule can be understood as follows: Inadmissible evidence
may be admissible through the testimony of an expert witness, so long
as the testimony is phrased as an "independent opinion." 5  This rule
is not limited to forensic experts, and can in fact apply to any expert in
any field. 5 4 Under the majority's rule, "any expert could give an
opinion based on any outside inadmissible evidence, no matter how
clearly testimonial or pointedly designed to prove an element of the
State's case, without running afoul of the Confrontation Clause." 5 5
Such a rule is objectively beneficial to the prosecution.156
The rule expressed by the Court in these opinions reveals two cen-
tral flaws in the Court's reasoning. Specifically, the Court held that
the information and conclusions contained in an inadmissible forensic
laboratory report created by an analyst who does not testify at trial
may be admissible through the expert testimony of a different analyst,
if the reports are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field."' 5 ' The North Carolina Supreme Court has classified this evi-
dence as nontestimonial, and therefore not subject to a Crawford
151. Id. at _, 744 S.E.2d at 465 ("Agent Schell's status as an expert witness does not allow
the State to bypass the Confrontation Clause by simply asking her to read the conclusions of
nontestifying witnesses into evidence. Nor has she provided any independent expert opinion-
developed through her own analysis-for which the lab reports were a basis.").
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See State v. Ortiz-Zape, N.C.-, 743 S.E.2d at 163 (opening the door for the appli-
cation of this rule to any field, and explaining that "when an expert gives an opinion, the opinion
is the substantive evidence and the expert is the witness whom the defendant has the right to
confront."), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No.
13-633).
155. State v. Brewington, - N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 626, 629 (2013) (Hudson, J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
156. See id. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 631 (2013) (Beasley, J., dissenting).
157. State v. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. , 743 S.E.2d 156, 161 (2013), petition for cert. filed, 2013
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No. 13-633); see also Jennifer A. Brobst,
Right to Confrontation - Crawford Ruling - Forensic Reports, Admissibility of Evidence in N.C.
§24:10.
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analysis, so long as the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine
the expert who testifies at trial.'
The expert must give an "independent expert opinion" of the re-
sults, and if so, the expert's testimony can serve as the only substan-
tive evidence to prove an essential element of the charged crime.'5
However, an expert witness may not give "surrogate testimony,"
merely "parroting" the opinions and conclusions of the underlying an-
alyst's test results and procedures, without conducting any indepen-
dent review or analysis.' 60 The Court's analysis of this issue thus turns
on determining whether the testimony is an "independent opinion" or
"surrogate testimony;"16 1 however, the Court failed to comprehen-
sively define either term.1 6 2 The majority "declined to follow the gui-
dance of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment opinions,
from Crawford thorough Williams, and has thus failed to protect a
defendant's right to confront witnesses against him."1 6 1
Part IV of this Comment will explore two central flaws in the rule
created by the North Carolina Supreme Court. First, part (A) will
explore the Court's confusion between the evidentiary and constitu-
tional issues presented by these cases. Second, part (B) will criticize
the Court's arbitrary and unfounded reliance on the classification of
evidence as an independent opinion or surrogate testimony.
A. Confusion Between Evidentiary and Constitutional Issues
The source of the majority's grievous rule apparently stems from its
confusion between the constitutional and evidentiary issues that
muddy this area of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.16 4 It has
been noted that "North Carolina did not come quietly into the new
world of confrontation under Crawford and its progeny." 6 5 How-
ever, as Justice Hudson explained, "[t]he majority may disagree with
the rulings of the United States Supreme Court, but we are nonethe-
less bound by them, as we are bound by the Constitution of the
United States."1 66
158. Ortiz-Zape, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 161 n. 1.
159. Id. at 162.
160. Id.
161. See State v. Craven, _ N.C. _ 744 S.E.2d 458, 460 (2013).
162. See Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 162.
163. State v. Brewington, - N.C. _, _ , 743 S.E.2d 626, 629 (2013) (Hudson, J., dissent-
ing), petition for cert, filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
164. Brief for North Carolina Advocates for Justice as Aimici Curae Supporting Petitioner,
Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 WL 6858555, at *8-9 (Dec. 26, 2013).
165. Id. at *7 (noting that "[firom the outset, North Carolina courts misapplied Crawford.");
citing State v. Lewis, 360 N.C. 1, 619 S.E.2d 830 (2005) (no confrontation violations); State v.
Forest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. App. 2004) (no confrontation violation).
166. Brewington, _ N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 629 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
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As an initial point, the defendant in each case challenged his convic-
tion on Sixth Amendment grounds, not based on the rules of evi-
dence, and as such "the North Carolina Rules of Evidence have no
place in this discussion. "167 However, the majority relied heavily on
the rules of evidence in crafting this rule.'16  The North Carolina
Rules of Evidence allow expert testimony "in the form of an opinion,"
if the expert's "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue," provided: "(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data[;] (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods[; and] (3) The witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case." 169 The expert may base the
opinion on information "made known to him at or before the hear-
ing," and "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inference upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence." 7 The majority
found that, because a laboratory report was "of a type reasonably re-
lied upon by experts" in the field of forensic science, then the expert
may base her opinion on that information, so long as it was an "inde-
pendent expert opinion" and not "'mere surrogate testimony' parrot-
ing otherwise inadmissible statements.""7
The rules of evidence cannot be used to escape the guarantees of
the Confrontation Clause. 172 Under the Supremacy Clause, the rules
of evidence "are entirely without effect when they contradict the Con-
frontation Clause." 73  Yet, the majority used the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence to bypass the Confrontation Clause, "such an out-
come is impermissible under the Supremacy Clause." 74 "To permit
independent opinion testimony on a critical element of the offense
when that opinion is based on evidence presented at trial 'not for the
truth of the matter asserted' is to permit the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence to preempt the Confrontation Clause."" Therefore, the
majority violated the protections of the United States Constitution in
relying on the rules of evidence in crafting its decision.
167. State v. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. -,_ 743 S.E.2d 156, 171 (2013) (Hudson, J., dissent-
ing), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No. 13-633).
168. See id.
169. N.C. R. Evid. § 8C-1,702 (2013).
170. N.C. R. Evid. § 8C-1,703 (2013).
171. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 162.
172. See State v. Brewington, - N.C. -, -, 743 S.E.2d 626, 632 (2013) (Beasley, J.,
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The majority's confusion between the constitutional and evidentiary
issues is especially apparent in Footnote 1 in Ortiz-Zape.17 6 The
Court stated that "[i]f the challenged testimony is not hearsay-in
other words, if the witness does not repeat out-of-court statements-
then it is not necessary to determine whether a lab report is testimo-
nial."'17 The Court thus explained that the expert's testimony was not
hearsay because the expert was not repeating out-of-court state-
ments." Classifying the evidence as not hearsay, the Court con-
cluded that it was therefore not testimonial, and thus admissible as an
independent analysis."' The problem with the Court's analysis is that
the classification of a statement as "hearsay" and the classification of a
statement as "testimonial" are two discrete analyses. Although the
concepts overlap, the determination of whether a statement is hearsay
is based solely on modern evidentiary laws; while the classification of
a statement as "testimonial" derives from the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation in Crawford of the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.'o
The rule announced by the North Carolina Supreme Court in this
series of opinions is entirely contrary to the mandates of the United
States Supreme Court. Justice Scalia explained that the Sixth Amend-
ment "applies to 'witnesses' against the accused-in other words,
those who 'bear testimony.""s In fact, the Court explicitly rejected
"the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only
to in-court testimony and that its application to out-of-court state-
ments introduced at trial depends upon the law of Evidence for the
time being."' 82 While recognizing that the ultimate goal of the Con-
frontation Clause is to "ensure reliability of evidence," the Court em-
phasized the fact that the Clause is a procedural, not substantive,
guarantee.183 The Clause "commands, not that evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
the crucible of cross-examination."1 84 Here, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court majority advocates the very view that the Court rejected
in Crawford.
The majority attempted to avoid the constitutional issue by classify-
ing the opinion, analysis, and data of the non-testifying analyst as hav-
176. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633,
2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (Nov. 21, 2013)(noting that the majority avoided the Con-
frontation Clause issue by "basing its analysis on a faulty premises").
177. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 162 n.1.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
181. Id. at 51.
182. Id. at 50-51.
183. Id. at 61.
184. Id.
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ing been admitted solely for the purpose of providing the basis of the
expert's opinion, and not for the truth of the matter asserted.'8 5 How-
ever, when such testimony is admitted into evidence, a jury will con-
sider it for its truth, and "could hardly do otherwise."' 8 6 "[W]hen the
truth of the matter asserted in a lab report is critical to the State's
case, and not merely evidence to bolster the State's case, any attempt
to reveal the substance of that report, regardless of the stated purpose,
without making its author available for cross-examination necessarily
violates" the Confrontation Clause.187
The rule created by the North Carolina Supreme Court is objec-
tively beneficial to the prosecution, as the State can now "present the
fruits of the laboratory analysis, confident that the jury will see them
as conclusive scientific evidence, yet unencumbered by testing in the
crucible of cross-examination."' This allows "Confrontation Clause
defects [to be] eliminated by arbitrarily designating that testimony,
and indeed even the laboratory report itself, as the foundation for the
expert testimony."' Justice Beasley explained that the problem with
this is that "the testifying expert cannot verify that no mistakes were
made in the testing or that the results generated by the testing analyst
were not based on false information, error, or lies. This information
cannot be ascertained without the right to confront the testing ex-
pert."190 It is "[t]hese representations, relating to past events and
human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, [that] are
meet for cross-examination." 1 9'
Even applying evidentiary principles, the person who tested the
substance and certified it as cocaine is the witness against the defen-
dant.'92 Accordingly, it is this person whom the defendant has the
right to confront under the Sixth Amendment.1 93 Justice Hudson ex-
plained that, even if the testifying analyst had formed her opinion by
reviewing only the raw data, this opinion would only be relevant if the
State provided the requisite foundation for the data, "a foundation
that would presumably require testimony from the non-testifying ana-
185. Brief for North Carolina Advocates for Justice as Aimici Curae Supporting Petitioner,
Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 WL 6858555, at *12 (Dec. 26, 2013).
186. Id. at *12-13.
187. State v. Brewington, - N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 626, 631 (2013) (Beasley, J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
188. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ortiz-Zape v. North Carolina, No. 13-633, 2013 U.S. S.
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739, at *13 (Nov. 21, 2013).
189. Id.
190. Brewington, - N.C. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 633.
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lyst anyway." 194 If the report itself is not admitted into evidence and
the testifying analyst is not allowed to testify from the report about
chain-of-custody, there is no independent evidence establishing that
the data reviewed was in fact from the sample taken at the crime
scene.'95 Without this foundation, the testimony is not relevant, and
therefore inadmissible.1 9 6
Further, even if Agent Ray's testimony was admissible as an inde-
pendent expert opinion, it would be legally insufficient to prove the
identity of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt.'97 In her dis-
senting opinion in Ortiz-Zape, Justice Hudson explained that,
"[e]ffectively, [Agent Ray's] opinion is 'if everything was done prop-
erly, and if the report is accurate, then the substance is cocaine.' With-
out other evidence to confirm those assumptions, there is no actual
proof that defendant possessed cocaine."'" Thus, even following the
majority's arbitrary rule set forth in these opinions, the evidence is
still legally insufficient to convict the defendant of the charged
offense.' 99
B. The Court's Amorphous Distinction Between an Independent
Opinion and Surrogate Testimony
The crux of the majority's analysis relies on a determination of
whether the expert testimony is an "independent opinion" or mere
"surrogate testimony." This distinction stems from the fact that "[t]he
decision in Bullcoming leaves room for an expert who did not conduct
the testing in question to offer an 'independent opinion' on the fact at
issue."2 00 However, while the Court places this distinction at the heart
of its analysis, it fails to define either term, and therefore leaves "our
lower courts ... with no guidance on what constitutes an 'independent
opinion' when data are 'truly machine-generated,' and when a viola-
tion of the Confrontation Clause has occurred." 2 0 1
194. State v. Ortiz-Zape, N.C. _, 743 S.E.2d 156, 170 (2013) (Hudson, J., dissent-
ing), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4739 (U.S. Nov. 21, 2013) (No. 13-633)
("if the prosecution cannot muster any independent admissible evidence to prove the founda-
tional facts that are essential to the relevance of the expert's testimony, then the expert's testi-






199. See Id. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 173.
200. State v. Craven, N.C. -, - 744 S.E.2d 458, 464 (2013) (Hudson, J., concurring);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
201. State v. Brewington, N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 626, 639 (2013) (Beasley, J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
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The Court's distinction between an independent opinion and surro-
gate testimony was clearly articulated in Ortiz-Zape when the major-
ity explained that "when an expert states her own opinion, without
merely repeating out-of-court statements, the expert is the person
whom the defendant has the right to cross examine . . . 'It is the expert
opinion itself, not its underlying factual basis, that constitutes substan-
tive evidence."' 2 0 2 However, as Justice Hudson explained, this
statement
completely ignores the Supreme Court's explanations of the scope of
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Indeed, if that state-
ment were law, any expert could give an opinion based on any outside
inadmissible evidence, no matter how clearly testimonial or pointedly
designed to prove an element of the State's case, without running
afoul of the Confrontation Clause. This is precisely the type of prob-
lem that the Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed since Crawford,
and most recently in Williams. The majority may disagree with the
rulings of the United States Supreme Court, but we are nonetheless
bound by them, as we are bound by the Constitution of the United
States.20
Justice Hudson clarified that "in reality the majority has created a rule
under which the State can circumvent the Confrontation Clause sim-
ply by asking the testifying analyst the question: 'What is your inde-
pendent expert opinion? "204
Justice Beasley reached a similar conclusion, and urged that "[w]e
must not create a back door to evade the Confrontation Clause by
merely changing the diction from 'surrogate' to 'independent opin-
ion. "'205 She explained that "[w]hen a jury is capable of drawing the
same conclusions as the substitute expert if given the same informa-
tion (i.e. the report), this is indicative that the expert is merely parrot-
ing the testing analyst's result . . . No expert knowledge is necessary
and could not possibly produce an 'independent' opinion" separate
from the inadmissible report.20 6
This is especially clear when distinguishing Craven from Brewington
and Ortiz-Zape, where the key factual distinction was that in Brew-
ington and Ortiz-Zape the State asked the witness for the testing ana-
lyst's conclusion, as opposed to in Craven where the State asked the
witness for her personal opinion. 20 7 "This is mere semantics." 20 8 JUS-
tice Hudson explained that
202. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 161.
203. Brewington, N.C. at , 743 S.E.2d at 629 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
204. Craven, _ N.C. at _, 744 S.E.2d at 464 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
205. State v. Brewington,_ N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 626, 634 (2013) (Beasley, J., dissenting),
petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
206. Id.
207. See id. at -, 743 S.E.2d at 638.
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The majority's rule, as applied in Ortiz-Zape and Brewington, does not
actually require any independent analysis or work on the expert's part.
The expert may simply review the nontestifying analyst's report and
adopt its conclusions as her own. That rule is flatly inconsistent with
United States Supreme Court precedent on this issue.209
"That the majority in Craven holds a Confrontation Clause violation
occurred under the precedent of Bullcoming, but fails to do so here, is
a remarkable demonstration of the semantics embodied in the term
'independent opinion. "210
PART V
Not much is clear in this area of Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence. However, there is one thing that is certain: it will continue to
evolve. The lack of an identifiable rule in Williams has created confu-
sion and uncertainty in lower courts around the country.211 The de-
fendants in both Brewington and Ortiz-Zape have petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for certiorari to resolve the confusion
created by Williams. 212
While the legal community waits for the Nation's Highest Court to
resolve this constitutional conundrum, North Carolina officials would
be wise to give only limited deference to the rule declared by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in this series of opinions. The State of
North Carolina must protect the constitutional rights of criminal de-
fendants, and must also ensure that convictions are not vacated or
overturned because of an avoidable technicality. If the United States
Supreme Court grants certiorari in either of these pending petitions
(or in a different Confrontation Clause petition) it is likely that it will
resolve the Williams confusion consistent with its opinions in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.
In the interim, there is a relatively simple solution that will avoid
this issue altogether. The State can simply call the testing analyst to
testify at trial. If the analyst who originally tested the sample is not
available to testify at trial, the State can have the testifying expert
personally retest the sample prior to trial.21 3 The testifying expert
would then have personal knowledge of the identity of the substance,
208. Id.
209. Craven, - N.C. at -, 744 S.E.2d at 465 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
210. Brewington, - N.C. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 638 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
211. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Brewington, - N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 626 (No. 13-
504); and Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Ortiz-Zape, - N.C. -, 743 S.E.2d 156 (2013)
(No. 13-633).
212. See id.
213. Craven, N.C. at _ 744 S.E.2d at 465 (Hudson, J., dissenting) (insisting that "the
expert have actually done independent analysis-either by doing his or her own analysis of raw
data obtained by the nontestifying analyst or (preferably) retesting the substance and reporting
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and there would be no Confrontation Clause violation. The expert's
testimony would be a true "independent opinion" regarding crucial
evidence against the defendant, and cross-examination by the defen-
dant would sufficiently reveal any defects in the testing process. It is
important to note that, while the criminal defendant can subpoena the
testing analyst to testify at trial, it is the State's burden to prove each
element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.214 If the
State does not meet this burden, it does not fall to the defendant to
bring in a witness who will present testimony against him.215
While this process is admittedly more expensive and burdensome to
the State, it is significantly less burdensome than having to re-try cases
that may be overturned as a result of future Supreme Court decisions.
Further, while this new standard is "perhaps inconvenient, this is not
too high a hurdle to impose to protect our citizens' constitutional
rights." 216 "The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of
criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to
trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confron-
tation Clause-like those other constitutional provisions-is binding,
and we may not disregard it at our convenience." 2 17
PART VI: CONcLusIoN
In this series of cases, the North Carolina Supreme Court set forth a
self-contradictory rule that essentially road-maps an end-run around
the Confrontation Clause. 2 18 This rule, which is objectively beneficial
to the prosecution, severely limits the Confrontation Clause rights for
criminal defendants. The Court misinterpreted the Supreme Court's
fractured decision in Williams, and used this misinterpretation to sup-
port a dangerous retreat from the well-settled guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment. The confusion that was created by the Supreme Court
in Williams will need to be resolved in the years to come. Until that
his or her own results. Otherwise, the Sixth Amendment gives defendant the right to confront
the testing analyst by cross-examination.").
214. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009) (No. 07-591), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-tran-
scripts/07-591.pdf (arguing that "the right to confrontation is a passive right in the defendant's
hands. It requires the prosecution to arrange for the confrontation. . ."). But cf Taylor v. Illi-
nois, 484 U.S. 400, 402 (1988) (explaining that the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor).
215. Id.
216. State v. Brewington,_ N.C._,_ , 743 S.E.2d 626, 639 (2013) (Beasley, J., dissent-
ing), petition for cert. filed, 2013 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2013) (No. 13-504).
217. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 325 (2009).
218. See Brewington, _ N.C. _, 743 S.E.2d at 634 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
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time, North Carolina courts should give only limited deference to this
new rule set forth by the North Carolina Supreme Court in order to
protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
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